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Poinsot versus Peirce on Merging with Reality by Sharing a Quality
Abstract
C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that 
signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This 
qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata 
of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late-
medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter 
how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, 
between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is 
touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe 
that, judged by realist standards, his requirement of minimal 
dissimilarity backfires. Poinsot thinks that, in analyzing the sign, 
we should stop before a full merger between sign-vehicle and 
object is reached. Peirce, by contrast, saw good reason to push 
the analysis all the way down to one isolated quality. Because such 
a qualitative merger can lend support to realism, I favour Peirce’s 
stance.
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“Of course thought can be distanced from the world by being 
false, but there is no distance from the world implicit in the very 
idea of thought.”
(John McDowell, Mind and World, 2002: 27)
1. Introduction2
In 1632 Spain, John Poinsot (religious name John of St. Thomas) published 
an advanced textbook, the Artis Logicae Prima et Secunda Pars. Given the 
decline of Aristotelian logic, interest in that work has long since waned. 
However, Poinsot also included in that textbook a detailed discussion of 
signs. Given the rise of semiotics, that portion of his work is attracting 
growing attention – so much so that a new hardcover bilingual edition of 
Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis was published in 2013.
Bold claims are being made about that work. Poinsot, some say, is the 
antidote to the scepticism of Descartes (Deely 2008) and the idealism 
of Kant (Furton 1997). Poinsot is not just supposed to add one more 
1 University of Helsinki; gnosiology@hotmail.com
2 Earlier versions were presented at the American Philosophical Association and the 
University of Toronto’s Centre for Medieval Studies. I want to thank Douglas Rasmussen, 
Joshua Mugg, Jason Breen, Abigail Klassen, Alberto Richards, as well as anonymous 
reviewers and editors of Versus. I am especially grateful to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen for his 
support and friendship. This article is a sequel to Champagne (2014b).
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philosophical stance to the accepted roster; rather, he is supposed to be 
a game-changer. John Deely, Poinsot’s contemporary translator, recently 
published a monograph (2009) arguing that the Tractatus de Signis can 
reshape some of the most fundamental issues in philosophy, to the point 
of rendering traditional epistemology obsolete. Such pronouncements 
demand scrutiny.
Anyone trained in mainstream philosophy will indeed notice something 
different about Poinsot’s style of inquiry. The agenda is just not the same. 
In contrast with his contemporary René Descartes, who self-consciously 
disowned his scholastic education (cf. Champagne 2008), we do not find 
in Poinsot’s Latin writings the speculative back-flips that afterwards 
became necessary to accommodate sceptical worries about large-scale 
deception. Sadly, Poinsot’s own back-flips are in the service of religious 
dogma. Still, according to Douglas Rasmussen, “if we are to get beyond 
the terms in which the current realist/antirealist debate is conducted, it is 
to Poinsot and the tradition he represents that we should go” (1992: 274). 
Semioticians who wish to see their discipline “no longer blocked by the 
persistent dualisms so widespread in cognitive science and philosophy of 
mind” (Stjernfelt 2014: 307) should therefore pay close attention.
Although the historical originality of Poinsot’s ideas has been 
questioned by some scholars (Ashworth 1988; Marmo 1987), my concern 
in this paper is not exegetic. Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates 
as a realist. If being a realist means believing that we can know how things 
really are, then Poinsot is clearly committed to some form of realism. 
However, I am not certain that his realism is as robust as it could be. My 
worry has to do with how Poinsot treats iconicity.
If we follow C. S. Peirce and define an icon as any sign-vehicle that 
stands for its object in virtue of resembling or being like that object, then 
we encounter a tension. Because similarity is a matter of degree, we can 
imagine, at one extreme, a situation where the relata at hand resemble each 
other so completely that they are in fact one and the same. In such a case, 
it would make little sense to speak of there being a “resemblance.” The 
question in turn becomes whether semiotic theory should countenance 
such a state of unbroken unity, or whether it should make division-into-
two the most basic situation attainable. I want to make this tension of 
iconicity explicit. 
I agree that “an evaluation of Poinsot’s doctrine demands a detailed 
and patient study exposing his doctrine to a lengthy comparison with 
the formal and quasi-necessary doctrine of signs of Peirce” (Santaella 
Braga 1991: 158). The disagreement between these major figures, though 
technical, boils down to this: Poinsot thinks that, in analyzing the sign, 
we should stop at two things, before the merger between sign-vehicle and 
object is reached; whereas Peirce thinks that we should push our analysis 
all the way down to one, where there is a merger.
Because such a qualitative merger is one of the ways in which minds 
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can connect with the world (cf. Champagne 2006: 29-33), I will argue that 
a realist should favour Peirce’s stance.
2. The Tension Inherent in any Icon
Here is the problem. Whatever is going on in our heads is not an end in 
itself, at least most of the time. It seems fair to say, then, that a sizable 
portion of our mental life is directed at something other than itself. Since 
a sign is anything that stands for something else – “aliquid stat pro aliquo,” 
in the generic medieval formula (Jakobson 1979: 16) – it is appropriate to 
approach such a transaction between mind and world as a semiotic one. 
This raises two questions: When a thinking subject represents a worldly 
object in her mind, can the representation she entertains truly bear on the 
relevant object? And, if so, how?
I will assume without argument that a successful vindication of realism 
would be a good thing to have, so I will answer the first question in 
the affirmative. The next question, however, calls for a more delicate 
response. What exactly does it mean for a mental representation to bear 
truthfully on its worldly object? In other words, if signs are in the business 
of relating things, how should we construe the relation involved in cases 
of veridical representation?
Sign-vehicles can stand for their objects in three different ways: by 
conventional imputation, causal interaction, or resemblance. Focusing 
on this last kind, it was Peirce (CP 3.359-403)3 who introduced the term 
“icon” to characterize sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of 
a quality shared with those objects. This qualitative kinship, however, 
makes icons a unique and potentially problematic class of signs, since it 
threatens to collapse the semiotic bond by merging the relata into one and 
the same thing. For “[s]hould the sign ever fully merge with the signified, 
it would no longer exist as a sign. [...] Since the sign is a substitution for 
another, duplication of the object into the thing itself and representation 
of the thing is impossible” (Furton 1995: 130).
Thus, in actual sign-action, twin constraints govern iconic 
representation. The relata at hand cannot be so dissimilar that they are 
radically alien from each other. Generalizing this insight, we arrive at Sir 
William Hamilton’s law of homogeneity, which states that “things most 
unlike must in some respects be like” (Runes 1980: 129). If two (or more) 
objects are seen to be similar, then the extreme case of such an experience 
would be that of a complete likeness, merging two things into one. This 
leads to a concomitant constraint, which is that a given similarity cannot 
3 References to Peirce follow the scholarly convention of giving the volume number 
of the Collected Papers, followed by the paragraph number(s) after a period. Thus, in the 
present case, “CP 3.359-403” directs one to volume 3, paragraphs 359 to 403.
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be so pronounced that it effectively collapses the relation between the 
things. Minimally, a split or hiatus must intervene for an iconic bond 
to be put to use. Accordingly, Hamilton’s law of homogeneity must be 
coupled with the law of heterogeneity, which states that “things the most 
homogeneous [or] similar [...] must in certain respects be heterogeneous 
[or] dissimilar” (Runes 1980: 126). Sign-vehicle and object must therefore 
remain existentially distinct, otherwise they melt into an undifferentiated 
unity (indices and symbols are spared this fate, insofar as both causal 
interaction and conventional association ensure the requisite rupture).4
The following can help to illustrate what is at stake. I am in this room 
right now. Yet, those surroundings are nevertheless not “in” my mind. 
The scene I am enjoying from a first-person perspective is therefore, in 
some sense, a surrogate or stand-in for the genuine article. I want to hold 
on to this truth. Nevertheless, I am not trapped in some sort of theatre 
and, so far as I can tell, the experiential display before me is an accurate 
representation of its object. At the very least, whatever speculative worries 
might cause me to doubt this would have to be imported from somewhere 
else. Indeed, if I abide by phenomenological honesty, I have to grant that 
the experiences I am enjoying are enough “like” their objects to license 
my confidence that those episodes are a sign of worldly things in a richer 
and more demanding way than my mere imputation. I do not take the 
initiative to bind a first-person spectacle with an extra-mental reality. On 
the contrary, the perceptual signs are motivated in such a way that I do 
not, by my very act of judgement, bring the likeness into being, but I 
merely add an explicit grasp to a mind-independent relation that was 
already there. However, I do not want this to mean that because I have a 
given thing before me, I own it outright. I don’t – and my non-inferential 
access to it, no matter how thorough and convincing, must never erase 
that fact. The worldly thing escapes my grasp and gaze by the fact that it 
is not me.
3. Poinsot’s Buffer
In his Tractatus de Signis, Poinsot explicitly considers this tension. The 
Thomistic tradition he aligned himself with recognized that, unless we 
make our concepts the targets of higher-order reflection, those concepts 
will efface themselves in regular experience (Dalcourt 1994: 6; Furton 
4 Peirce (CP 2.277) also subdivided icons into images, diagrams, and metaphors. 
Supposing that this subdivison holds, I am interested in the trait that binds together the 
genus, not the differentia that set apart its species. Images certainly connect better with a 
discussion of mental imagery (Dalcourt 1994). In any event, Poinsot had his subdivisons too, 
so we must guard against “making Peirce’s doctrine an absolute touchstone of the truth” 
(Santaella Braga 1991: 158). To make headway, I am letting the needs of the issue, not the 
presence of the textual sources, determine what is relevant.
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1997: 72, 121). This is because the sign-vehicles spawned by the mind 
do not work like the sign-vehicles crafted by the hand: “The squeak is 
physical sound, and the written word is ink on paper. Their signifying 
function is incidental to their physical being. But a concept does nothing 
but signify” (Wild 1947: 226; cf. Peifer 1952: 193). Yet, if one agrees with 
this, it becomes difficult to say why one should posit the contribution of 
a concept in the first place. Hence, in the course of his inquiry into “what 
conditions are required for something to be a sign” (TDS 218/29-30),5 
Poinsot comes to the conclusion that:
[T]he more a representation is one with the thing represented, the better and 
more efficacious is the representation. Yet no matter how perfect, a concept in 
us does not attain to identity with the represented, because it never attains to 
this, that it represents itself, but [always rather] another than itself, because it 
always functions as something vicarious in respect of an object; it always retains 
a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying. (TDS 
228/9-18)
Voicing the caveat that such differentiation does not apply to divine 
revelation (TDS 233/3-25), Poinsot is keen to point out that, in all other 
instances of semiotic mediation, iconic likeness is never complete – and 
this, as a matter of principle.
Essentially, Poinsot wants to taint similarity so that a can never stand for 
a, since the shortcut of simply contemplating a would annul the “standing 
for” relation. Call this restriction “Poinsot’s buffer.” It requires that “a 
sign must be more known and more manifest than the significate in the 
representing, so that in being and in knowable rationale it is dissimilar 
and [unequal or] subsidiary to that significate” (TDS 217/38-41).
Going over this last sentence carefully, the three criteria adopted by 
Poinsot are that, compared to its object, the sign-vehicle must be 1) more 
known (“manifestius”), 2) subordinate or less perfect (“inferius”), and 
3) dissimilar (“dissimile”). Although “the criterion that the sign be more 
known than the signified is clearly what troubles John [Poinsot]” (Furton 
1995: 126), I can see why criterion (1) would hold. The “subordination” 
in (2) seems to be a corollary of (1). However, criterion (3) is what seems 
to me misplaced.
Poinsot is widely considered a realist, but I think that, judged by realist 
standards, his requirement of minimal dissimilarity backfires. Let me now 
unpack that worry.
5 References to Poinsot follow the scholarly convention of giving the page number of 
the 2013 Deely translation, followed by the line number(s) after a slash. Thus, in the present 
case, “TDS 228/9-18” directs one to page 218, lines 29 and 30.
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4. When the Message is the Medium
Given that human minds roam across particular locations, Poinsot 
reasoned that sense impressions, which last only so long, must supply 
information that survives brief acts of delivery (cf. Marmo 1987: 117). 
Indeed, “the sense, by means of the bodily organs, receives a precise 
impression or image of the sensible qualities, which is impressed directly 
on the organs” (Pellerey 1989: 87; cf. Tweedale 1990: 36). The moment 
this happens, the mental content at hand becomes a sign of the thing(s) 
that spawned it. The transmission of contents across the various faculties 
(Fodor 1983) is thereafter sustained by forces which we would today 
describe in a neuroscientific idiom.
The possibility of tracking functional relations between sensory inputs 
and motor outputs creates a temptation to understand all cognitive 
processes solely in terms of efficient causation. In the Thomistic account, 
though, “[t]he sequence of signs from sensible reality to abstract concepts 
is founded on the validity of the Similitude and on the necessity of the 
cause-effect relation” affecting our sense organs and brain (Pellerey 1989: 
103). We can use an analogy with a seal of wax to explain how this action 
has both an iconic and indexical component. The seal and the malleable 
substance must at some point collide, so in that respect one can be taken 
as the index of the other. Still, the wax, once impressed, is an icon of the 
convex seal and can therefore continue to stand for that object even when 
detached from its original causal encounter (TDS 254/1-255/15).
There is no denying that, like the seal pressed on the wax (or the wax 
pressed on the seal?), our experience of the world involves impacts of 
sorts (Champagne 2014a). Yet, if the qualitative stand-ins that result from 
such situated impacts can also tether minds to the world, why would 
anyone committed to realism refuse the prospect of a perfect similarity?
I think that what prompts Poinsot to add his dissimile clause is 
Aquinas’ thesis that “[a]lthough it is necessary for the truth of cognition 
that the cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessary that 
the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition” 
(Summa Contra Gentiles; translation by Rasmussen 1994: 417). A default 
recommendation to tease these two elements apart can certainly benefit 
inquiry in most instances. The problem, however, is that in iconicity what 
we know is precisely how we came to know it.
There is more at stake here than individual knowledge. If my semiotic 
constitution is such that I can approximate but never fully match a given 
quality (say, the taste of cilantro), then you and I can never use this quality 
to fully share our state(s) of mind (cf. O’Dea 2002: 177). Trying to achieve 
intersubjective agreement by jointly attending to evidence thus becomes 
an inherently flawed communicative strategy.
Since this would be a major concession, let us look at an influential 
semiotic theory that does make room for a complete qualitative merger.
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5. Peirce’s Merger
Charles S. Peirce did not know of John Poinsot’s writings, but he had 
a working command of the philosophical literature of the medieval 
period (Boler 2004; Beuchot and Deely 1995; Tiercelin 2006). Indeed, 
“[w]hatever agreement we find between Peirce and Poinsot is based 
upon them independently discovering the same things about the nature 
of thought-signs” (Maroosis 2003: 157-158). Peirce agrees with Poinsot 
that, since a sign stands for something else, “one and the same thing never 
represents itself; for this identity cancels the rationale of a sign” (TDS 
234/4-5). Interestingly though, Peirce differs from Poinsot by making 
room for a complete merger in what he called “Firstness,” which is the 
state one gets when one subtracts a relation between relata so as to obtain 
only a lone relatum (the term “relatum” thus becoming a misnomer).
The important idea is this: If any two objects X and Y are similar in some 
respect, then X should possess that “respect” all on its own. Hence, were Y 
to vanish, X would retain the feature that made a comparison by similarity 
possible. Obviously, this applies to Y too. Yet, when we focus only on the 
relevant quality, we make ourselves unable to ascertain whether it is X or Y 
that is the quality’s bearer. Hence, at the proper level of analysis, whatever 
makes Y and X similar to each other is indifferent to where it is found.
The core observation motivating Poinsot’s buffer remains correct: 
lack of difference robs the minimal relation (and sense of direction) that 
allows us to properly taxonomize something as a sign. But, as a logician 
specialized in cataloguing relations, Peirce recognized that the complex 
(triadic) relations involved in semiosis subsume simpler (dyadic and 
monadic) ones. Hence, there should be no logical obstacle to supposing 
some parts of the sign absent.
Most of the confusion regarding “phenomenal qualia” in philosophy 
of mind stems from the fact that such abstract deletions (Champagne 
2009) can be carried past the point of numerical distinctness – even if it 
means that, in this impoverished state, signification vanishes. A quality 
would stand for anything like it, but that potential lies dormant if all we 
have before us is the quality itself. In that regard, icons are transparent 
and opaque,6 depending on how we view the situation. This vacillating 
semiotic/non-semiotic status is rendered soluble by keeping track of 
how many things one is countenancing in a given analysis. The Peircean 
category of Firstness is meant to remind us that, with one sign-vehicle in 
complete isolation, there can be no actual sign-action.
When, for whatever reason, the stream of consciousness which 
associates one thought to another ceases and is submerged in a unique 
6 The terms “transparency” and “opacity” are borrowed from vision, but they mark 
a pass/stop distinction applicable to all the sense modalities (cf. the smell discussed in 
Champagne 2014b: 151-152).
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thought, the semiotic potency inherent in that paused qualitative state 
cannot be actualized without something else entering the picture. Peirce 
writes that “in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose 
the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the 
copy disappears [...]. At that moment we are contemplating an icon” (CP 
3.362). This is the state I am in when I transparently take my experience to 
be what is experienced, when I partake of my environment so completely 
that I lose it and myself. Of course, aside from pharmaceutically-induced 
vegetative states, such a qualitative merger of “I” and “it” is never 
fully consummated; otherwise, as Poinsot put it, this would “cancel 
the rationale” of the sign (TDS 234/4-5). Still, Peirce is distinguished 
from Poinsot in making allowances for this possibility. Indeed, Peirce 
concludes that, in theory, pure “[i]cons are so completely substituted for 
their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them” (CP 3.362).7
In short, careful study of the conditions for the possibility of signification 
reveals a ground-level where similarity becomes so pronounced that it 
eradicates that with which the quality is similar. If we were to put these 
results in the technical terms used earlier, we would say that while actual 
sign-action is indeed constrained by Hamilton’s twin laws of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity, such actual semiosis logically implies a possible 
semiosis free from the constraint of heterogeneity.8
Poinsot holds that “a sign must be dissimilar [to its significate], [...] 
otherwise, if it is equally manifest, there is no reason for this to be a sign 
of one thing rather than a sign of some other thing [...]” (TDS 218/13-
17). If, however, the ground of any experience is likeness to the point of 
complete merger, then when one subtracts the divide between sign-vehicle 
and object, one obtains a communion between knower and known that is 
as close as close can be (Ransdell 1979).
6. Differences and Similarities
Do Poinsot and Peirce really differ on this point? John Deely (1980) 
suggests that the notion of “formal sign” we find in Poinsot is analogous 
to the contemporary notion of icon. Thus, in his translation, Deely 
proposes the term “icon” as substitute for the Latin term “idolum.” In 
Deely’s estimate, “[t]he closest English word to Poinsot’s use of idolum 
is the term ‘icon’ as defined semiotically by C. S. Peirce, c. 1903” (TDS 
241/fn3). However, since Poinsot’s system does not contain anything 
7 Interestingly, Peirce’s commitment to Firstness may owe something to pharmaceutical 
aids (cf. Brent 1998: 14).
8 Metaphysically, this analysis recommends, not just an ontology of relations (pace Bains 
2006), but an ontology of relations and relata – where the standing of a relatum is orthogonal 
to the distinction between matter and mind (cf. Paolucci 2011: 90-94).
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analogous to Peirce’s category of Firstness, I am not entirely convinced 
that their respective texts support the neat agreement that Deely and 
others (e.g., Maroosis 2003: 160) look for. I think the closest Poinsot 
comes to a pure icon in his Tractatus de Signis is when he mentions (only 
once) a “similitudo virtualis” (TDS 258/46), which is presumably the 
modally prior “principle whence arises a formal similitude and formal 
awareness” (TDS 258/45-46; emphasis in original). However, the term 
“virtual” will not be helpful until it is unpacked into something more 
tangible. The Peircean account does just that: to be an icon is to enjoy 
a monadic relation with an object, which is to say no relation at all (cf. 
Champagne 2014b: 153fn91).
By jettisoning one of the ways we have of getting in touch with things, 
Poinsot has access only to a correspondence theory of truth that turns on 
“correlation,” not “congruence” (Kirkham 1997: 119-120). Congruence 
uses similarity, but correlation does not require that the veridical 
correspondence involve any kind of isomorphism between truth-bearer 
and truth-maker. I think a realist should favour congruence, because it 
can let subjects directly experience qualities. For example, the flower I 
smell does not activate in me, say, a mental image of a square, which I 
then manipulate whenever I recollect or make inferences regarding the 
odour. Even if one could conceivably learn something informative about 
the world’s structure by means of such one-to-one couplings (cf. Pylyshyn 
1973), a more intimate bond with the environment is established when 
one enjoys an experiential likeness.
Poinsot, as I mentioned, exempted a privileged subset of cases from 
his dissimile requirement. Specifically, he held that “the Divine Word is 
excluded from the rationale of sign” (TDS 233/3-4) because it supposedly 
“attains to identity with the represented divine essence” (TDS 228/21-
22). Lifting the buffer was intended to spare scriptures and sacraments 
from being mere symbols. Interestingly, Joseph Ransdell (2003: 229-
231) speculated that the present discomfort regarding of iconicity in 
mainstream debates might be a hold-over of religious controversies. Are 
there any religious implications in the idea of “optimal” iconicity that I 
have been exploring?
Realizing that indices like “this” causally locate referents but fail to 
convey their qualitative feel, Mark Johnston (1992) proposed the term 
“revelation” to capture our direct appreciation of qualities like colours. 
That choice of word certainly courts non-secular readings. However, all 
that Johnston wants to convey is that “[t]he intrinsic nature of canary 
yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as [sic] of a canary 
yellow thing” (1992: 223). Surely this is not far-fetched.
Of course, on the analysis I have championed, focusing on a yellow 
quality at the expense of all relations is by no means a “standard” affair. 
To get there, one must artificially trim away quite a bit of lived experience 
(cf. Champagne 2014a: 226-228; 2014b: 146-149). The merger of sign-
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vehicle and object countenanced by Peircean semiotics constitutes what 
Frederik Stjernfelt calls “optimal” iconicity, a limit case that, by definition, 
“remains without any practically conceivable consequences” (2014: 230). 
Still, given that the qualitative unity we find in iconic signs logically 
underpins the human cognitive situation as a whole, I have endeavoured 
to account for it in a way that does not veer into philosophical (much less 
theological) extravagance.
7. Conclusion
Poinsot and Peirce clearly partake (from afar) in a common semiotic 
project. “If C. S. Peirce can be said to give us a chemistry of sixty-six sign-
compounds, John Poinsot, suitably revised, gives us the basic physical 
laws of motion that bring sign, object, and mind into relation” (Murphy 
1994: 569). The divergence I have been exploring essentially stems from 
the fact that the simplest sign would be no “compound” at all.
No one complains that, once obtained by means of a particle 
accelerator, a quark no longer exhibits the properties it had when it 
was part of a more complex molecule. The situation in semiotic inquiry, 
where the icon does not actually stand for anything else, should be no 
more troubling. What Poinsot has to say about the “motion” of semiosis 
remains valuable. Similarity remains relevant for cognitive functions 
that are not static, since shared qualities are partly what license the 
manipulations of “diagrammatic reasoning” (cf. Pietarinen 2011). Yet, 
if one opts to attend solely to the intrinsic character of a given item, 
one has thereby artificially impoverished one’s object of study to such 
an extent that the resultant quality is no longer related (inferentially or 
otherwise) to any object.
I should underscore just how close Poinsot’s semiotic hugs the 
asymptotic limit of complete likeness. He acknowledges that “in 
intentional or representative existence the formal sign is said to make one 
thing with the object, not only as do those things which coincide in one 
common rationale, but rather because it totally contains and represents 
the numerically same being that is in another” (TDS 233/43-234/2). But, 
he immediately adds that “this fact itself supposes that the representing 
and the represented are distinct” (TDS 234/2-3). If Poinsot’s buffer is 
in place, then strictly speaking his semiotic theory does not contain any 
icons, only symbols and indices. Very similar indices perhaps, but indices 
nonetheless.
Some philosophers (Bains 2006: 39-58; Deely 2001; Rasmussen 1994; 
Veatch 1952) have claimed that the semiotic of Poinsot has the technical 
resources to pre-empt sceptical/idealist worries. However, I think that, by 
preserving a minimal qualitative dissimilarity between mind and world, 
Poinsot deprives the realist quiver of a useful arrow. One of the tenets of 
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Poinsot’s account is that, insofar as it acts as a sign, a concept “as such 
does not stand in need of some scheme, linguistic or otherwise, to relate 
it to reality” (Rasmussen 1994: 410). I agree. However, I have argued that 
this is because, on some level, a sign-vehicle just is its object.
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